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Reports of high incidences of occupational illnesses in
the semiconductor industry should have triggered
global investigations and rigorous inspection of the
industry. Yet semiconductor plants remain essentially
unregulated. Health and safety standards are inade-
quate and enforcement is lax. Roles for stakeholders in
laying down good practice, monitoring, and regulating
are proposed, and obstacles are described. Effective
regulation has advantages for the industry as well as
workers. Conditions for best practice include educa-
tion at all levels, protection and support for labor
inspectors, government commitment to enforcing laws,
recognition of the right of workers to organize, and
recognition of their rights. Key words: semiconductor
industry; microelectronics industry; legislation; labor
unions; worker participation.
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The global semiconductor industry presents awide range of hazards and risks to employeeswhich may also change over time, work activity,
and geographic location.1,2 Commentators have rightly
noted occupational health and safety regulatory prob-
lems exist in the industry because of “the development
of the microelectronics industry in areas of the world
that lack sufficient regulation and enforcement of laws
to protect workers from occupational hazards and the
community from environmental hazards.”2 Evidence
about governmental regulation and enforcement stan-
dards and practices from those countries where the
semiconductor industry operates is not encouraging. 
There have been major enforcement problems in
China and problems with application of good health
and safety standards to multinational companies.3 In
the Philippines there has been a lack of occupational
health and safety enforcement powers and a recogni-
tion that “experience with industrialized countries
indicates that voluntary compliance by industry does not
work unless there are also regulations with accompanying
penalties for non-c compliance.”4 In Taiwan, even those
papers that do discuss that country’s semiconductor
health and safety provide little or no information about
the role of statutory external regulation and enforce-
ment.5 In Malaysia, evidence is emerging that regula-
tion and enforcement of ergonomics standards for
wafer-fabrication workers is failing because of the man-
ifestation of work-related musculoskeletal problems in
these workers.6
The experience of researchers in Asia who explored
the electronics industry in the 1980s was that “man-
agers and the government are often under pressure to
minimize costs of production and to maximize prof-
its,”7 and it would seem that little had changed by 2003. 
The industry argues that it is “high tech” and capa-
ble of identifying and removing any significant risks
from the hazardous materials and processes that it uses.
There is much debate about this, and some substantial
and growing evidence that the industry has provided
clean environments to ensure production of its prod-
ucts but, in occupational health and industrial hygiene
terms, potentially hazardous environments for some of
its workers across the world have been created and then
replicated. Where complex, multiple exposures to
chemicals occur, sometimes over years of an employee’s
life and often at low levels, the occupational health and
safety challenges and related inspection and enforce-
ment needs may be great. 
Surprisingly, industry guides did not appear to prior-
itize engineering and industrial hygiene controls when
the industry began, but rather emphasized the value of
personal protective equipment (PPE). One guide
devotes just one page in its opening chapter to engi-
neering controls and eight pages to PPE.8 Guides to
industrial hygiene in the industry were often relatively
sophisticated but also primarily based on monitoring of
the larger “merchant” semiconductor manufacturers in
1995 and may have been unrepresentative of what was
happening globally in the operations of smaller manu-
facturers.9 This indicates additional reasons why com-
prehensive and detailed inspection and enforcement of
controls are so critical to effective health and safety
practice in such an industry. Other more powerful driv-
ers than occupational health, safety, and the environ-
ment (OHSE) seem to have dominated the industry
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agenda. However, unlike detailed analyses of environ-
mental pollution and related regulatory issues relating
to high-tech industries in such countries as Japan,10 little
detailed work exists on occupational health and safety
regulation and enforcement specifically.
REGULATORY THEORY: WHY REGULATE?
Some economists, politicians, and health and safety
researchers advocate the free play of market forces
linked to current ideas about the neoliberal position
on regulation first presented by the Scottish economist,
Adam Smith. Adam Smith’s model is based on the
belief that hazardous industries will pay employees
high wages because they do dangerous work until a
point is reached where it becomes more economical
for such employers to remove or reduce hazards and so
lower wages. The theory presupposes that workers can
choose where they work and also have accurate infor-
mation about which are the hazardous industries and
which are the hazardous jobs. No external regulation
and enforcement at all is therefore needed according
to this theory.
This has simply not worked. First, it manifestly does
not initially remove hazards, so accidents and illnesses
will always occur. Second, hazardous industries para-
doxically may employ workers, often the most vulnera-
ble groups of workers, at lower-than-average wages pre-
cisely because people with a choice of employment do
not wish to work in hazardous industries and may be
able to choose not to. Migrant workers, illegal immi-
grants, and the unskilled often have no choice but to
work in dirty and dangerous occupations.11,12 The fail-
ure of market forces to protect workers’ occupational
health and safety has been frequently and well docu-
mented.13 Those who propose OHS management sys-
tems that are “self-monitoring, self-correcting and self-
improving” recognize the dangers of producing “the
trappings of self-regulation without delivering the
promised outcomes in terms of improved OHS per-
formance.”14 Much of the history of occupational
health and safety in the semiconductor industry may
well demonstrate such failings.
With regard to the major players in the IT hardware
industry, Geiser and Tickner rightly observed that
“global markets mean that the regulatory conditions of
the most aggressive nations tend to shape the product
design and management conditions for the entire
industry.” At the same they noted countervailing forces
whereby the EU, for example, “can ratchet up its regu-
latory standards and the industry finds that it must
ratchet up its performance even when large shares of
its markets are unaffected.”15 What of course we do not
know is how raised product standards or harmonized
standards impact occupational health and safety stan-
dards and practices in the semiconductor industry in
those regions where labor is disorganized and little if
any inspection or enforcement of occupational health
regulations occurs. 
Regulation may run a continuum from regulating
every process, system of work, and piece of machinery
through identifying key hazards and systems of work
that will effectively control ill-health and accidents at
work. Regulations may be narrow and prescriptive or
broad and generic, linked to risk assessment and risk
management. With flexibility may come better health
and safety practices, or potentially greater freedom
and poorer health and safety practice. There are many
different types of regulatory regimens with widely
diverse approaches to standard setting and then
enforcement of those standards through generic or
specialist agencies.16 Cost-benefit analyses have been
playing an increasingly large role in work of regulatory
enforcers who are linked to what are called “business-
friendly agendas,” but could be equally called
“worker/community-hostile or apathetic” agendas. It
is true that regulations per se cannot address major
and international occupational health and safety fail-
ings, however well, diligently, and widely enforced
such regulations may be. 
Four country-specific broad-based occupational
health and safety compliance strategies have been iden-
tified by Asian researchers: code-based approaches
(U.S.); performance-based approaches (U.K.); systems-
based approaches (Nordic); and specialist-based
approaches (Japan).17 The U.S. code-based approach
was viewed as antagonistic, but if no extensive and
effective enforcement occurs, it will not work. The U.K.
performance-based approach is meant to draw on
unionized labor, usually with employers, to solve health
and safety problems. Where unions are absent or weak,
however, workers will not be able to press for effective
solutions. The Japanese approach was government-ini-
tiated, top-down, and depended supposedly on cooper-
ation between unions and employers. It did not work
because of inertia. None of these approaches provided
effective and rigorous enforcement of regulations in
industries such as semiconductors.
What effective enforcement can do is to provide fun-
damental and basic safeguards and hence one critical
element—along with such things as workplace organi-
zation and trade union and worker rights, technical
resources and skills, employer commitment to worker
health, training, information and its dissemination,
and media awareness—in the complex picture of good
occupational health. Some propose self-regulation or
the two-track regulatory approach, which “places pri-
mary responsibility on employers and workers them-
selves to find optimal means of reducing occupational
injury and disease subject to government and third
party oversight.”18 This harks back to the Robens self-
regulation central to U.K. workplace health and safety
philosophy, which disingenuously assumed some sort
of equality of power between the various players. Self-
VOL 12/NO 1, JAN/MAR 2006 • www.ijoeh.com Regulation in Semiconductor Industry • 73
regulation by employers and employees always fails
employees in workplaces where they have minimal or
no organizational power, and would offer little to pro-
tect the occupational health of most vulnerable work-
ers in semiconductor plants across the world. 
Remarkably, in the occupational health and safety
world, against a backdrop of enormous global occupa-
tional disease and accident figures, some are working
on reducing regulatory interventions even further to
protect the most vulnerable workers through address-
ing “risk aversion.” At its extreme, this is taking the
form of educating children in European schools about
“risk” in a particular way. Hence, the curriculum may
raise the child’s “risk threshold” so that he or she is less
“risk-averse” and will, one assumes, accept even lower
occupational health and safety standards and enforce-
ment in the workplace.
REGULATORY PRACTICE IN THE
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
Striking the balance between effective laws and time-
consuming, resource-consuming, poorly targeted and
ineffective regulation may be of concern to many work-
ing in occupational health and safety. Effective regula-
tion, however, must rest on a clear understanding of
the hazards and risks presented to semiconductor
workers and recognition that there are significant data
gaps and therefore a need to build in, where possible,
a precautionary approach. The impacts of market reg-
ulations and environmental regulation and enforce-
ment on the semiconductor industry have received
attention.19 Yet very little, for instance, is known about
the regulatory enforcement of occupational health and
safety standards in the semiconductor industries of
Central and Eastern Europe.20
The assumption that the semiconductor industry
did operate good practice if not best practice and did
not harm its workers was challenged in the 1980s and
1990s. Sentinel events, poor health and safety records,
and data gaps in the industry’s capacity to assess many
health impacts were flagged at this time but not heeded
by the industry. By 1991, well-informed commentators
with occupational medicine expertise in the field had
identified that the incidence of occupational illnesses
in the Californian semiconductor industry was unusu-
ally high—three times that recorded for general manu-
facturing industries.21 These reports should have trig-
gered global investigations and merited rigorous
inspection of the industry. Yet what has recently been
revealed is that semiconductor plants even in Western
Europe and North America remained in several key
respects unregulated. Where recent inspections have
now occurred they show health and safety standards
and practices still leave much to be desired and indi-
cate that effective enforcement of health and safety
laws in such plants may be deficient.22
High-tech industries may not be the models of good
health and safety practice that some thought. For the
Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC), there was
recognition that even the best OSHA chemical-control
standards themselves did not provide adequate means
to protect worker health and safety in the semiconduc-
tor industry even if enforced.19 Rigorous standard set-
ting for exposures to chemical and physical agents
should be the foundation, linked to sound industrial
hygiene and engineering controls, for best occupa-
tional health, safety, and environmental (OSHE) prac-
tice against which regulators assess the industry. How-
ever, relatively little research has been carried out on
the enforcement of occupational and safety regulations
in the U.S. industry. In the United States, however, in
1997 it was noted that no OSHA inspector had been
inside the IBM East Fishkill plant for at least ten years.19
The OSHA Director of Compliance Programs in 1999
stated that “while [OSHA] does monitor [the semicon-
ductor industry] and conducts inspections, the indus-
try doesn’t typically show up on any OSHA pro-
grammed inspection targeting system due to its
relatively low injury and illness rate.”23
In 1989, NIOSH researchers looked at occupational
health and safety data they had access to for the semi-
conductor industries in the United States. They con-
cluded:”more detailed studies to identify processes
and/or exposures responsible for illnesses in semicon-
ductor manufacturing are needed. Then it would be
possible to develop a control scheme to better protect
the worker.”24 NIOSH also recognized that whereas
they had knowledge of many semiconductor health
hazards, there were “relatively new types of hazards that
have to be dealt with in this industry since process and
product technology continue to evolve rapidly” and
because “for the ‘new’ potential problems we still know
that control and reduction at the source is the primary
prevention tool.”25 Yet inspection and enforcement
appear to have played no major part in the develop-
ment of NIOSH/ OSHA strategies for improving
public health in the semiconductor industry at the end
of the 1980s. Better surveillance was flagged, more
research and control measures were called for, and
better dissemination of existing knowledge linked to
training was highlighted. Somehow, however, these
strands were automatically meant to translate into
effective factory action. This was at a time when reports
from a number of Californian electronics factories
were showing that effective health and safety practices
did not apply and many hazards remained uncon-
trolled and unregulated.26
Control schemes to regulate occupational health
and their effective enforcement are lacking in many
parts of the world at the beginning of the 21st century.
Also in the 1980s, other researchers called for a system
to be developed in the U.S. semiconductor industry
“for ongoing, periodic review and verification of
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OSHA-200 and OHS occupational illness and injury
classification decisions.”27 Such a system would again
have benefited enforcement agencies, but does not
appear to exist. 
Enforcement of regulation often relies on indicators
of potential problems, because resources and staff of
regulators may be limited, and arguments for targeted
interventions using such indicators therefore become
powerful. There may be additional problems about the
state of knowledge in a particular industry or process.
For researchers on the health and safety of the elec-
tronics industry it was recognized at an early date that
“laws are useless if they are not enforced and if the
workers are not educated about their rights, Therefore
governments should take an active role in continuous
monitoring of industry, in education, in providing
resources, and in updating and enforcing the law.”7
Contradictory arguments exist for rigorous or light-
touch regulation or enforcement of occupational
health and safety in the semiconductor industry. The
dominant industry view is that it has leading-edge tech-
nologies and sophisticated control systems, which
therefore protect products and workers very well in
what is a “clean” industry. The reality has been rather
different, and the image of a clean electronics industry
was being challenged and documented in the 1970s
and 1980s.26 In California this led to some regulatory
activity and enquiry: elsewhere it did not. Internation-
ally, however, the clean image of the industry, and its
extensive use of very sophisticated and advanced tech-
nologies and materials, appear to have led to many
countries’ regulators’ failing either to enforce occupa-
tional health and safety standards or doing so in ways
that have lacked rigor and proper critical analysis—
often relying on industry/company assurances about
good practices and hazard controls rather than seeking
to validate data themselves.22
The other argument recognized that a wide range of
known carcinogens, teratogens, other reproductive
health hazards, asthmagens, and physically hazardous
processes may have been used in the electronics indus-
try.28 Hence there was a need to carry out careful sur-
veillance. This was because when total cancer morbidity
in the electronics industry was compared with that of
the general working population in some countries, that
morbidity “was significantly higher than expected,”
although still modest and often regionally determined.
The position was further complicated because health
hazards were rarely reported in the 1980s.28 For the
Swedes, such findings, using a Cancer Environment
Registry trigger, were sufficient to lead in the early
1980s to calls for more work in the electronics industry,
especially to expand use of such registries and to seek
specific exposure data. The need for regulation and
enforcement in such settings in the 1980s was clear both
because of hazard evidence and because large numbers
of workers were employed in the semiconductor indus-
try—in the United States alone, there were 279,300
such workers, according to NIOSH estimates.24
In 2003, exposure data globally were still very sparse,
often not available publicly, or entirely absent. 
This was especially the case when there were different
industry practices in some companies dealing with the
same or similar chemicals: for instance, male skilled
print workers—often unionized in the United King-
dom—had pressed for and gained tough regulatory
action and substitution policies for glycol ethers in
their industries on the basis of international evidence
about reproductive health hazards to male workers.29
Yet regulatory and enforcement action relative to the
same group of chemicals in the electronics industry,
where unskilled and semi-skilled women workers were
employed, appears to have been absent. This may indi-
cate those factors that aid effective enforcement
through organized labor. It may also illustrate what
Karen Messing has aptly called “one-eyed science”
where women are or have been invisible workers, and
research on the hazards that may affect them most is
neglected. Enforcement strategies and regulatory con-
trols have neglected women workers in the past.29–31
Effective or better health and safety enforcement
and regulation linked to proper consultation between
employers, regulators, and employees appeared to rest
on the length of time a trade had existed and the age
of the industry, the gender distribution of workers, well
established unionization and workplace organization,
technical skills, and location of the workers, rather
than any activity by labor inspectors. Access to relevant
information and its dissemination was also critical to
the efforts of the print workers. Women workers in
electronics have, however, often moved remarkably fast
globally—faster than their male colleagues organized
over many decades—and often in far more vulnerable
economic and job-security circumstances, to raise and
address the health and safety shortcomings of indus-
tries and enforcers.29 These factors and characteristics
are important for the introduction, application, and
development of good regulatory policies and practices
and supporting infrastructures.
WHO, WHAT, AND HOW TO REGULATE
Effective enforcement should involve inspections of all
semiconductor plants at some stage and at some level.
Every company would therefore be inspected, and a
database about both occupational health and safety
problems, technical and organizational, and good prac-
tice could be built up and could be accessed by employ-
ees, communities, and independent health profession-
als, provided effective freedom of information
provisions were in place. Various production processes
would be covered and, again, those in developing coun-
tries could check best practice and past best practice
elsewhere in the world if they were using materials and
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equipment that lagged behind the industry leaders.
Enforcement of the law should also relate to owners,
directors, and shareholders in terms of corporate
accountability, and this would add to the effectiveness
of regulatory enforcement, because all industry stake-
holders would be held accountable for the actions of
their companies in some way.
Resource and staff limits might well lead to neces-
sary targeted interventions, after the initial inspections
had established baseline data, in those plants with the
poorest health and safety records. Accurate and com-
prehensive returns about plant occupationally caused
and related diseases would be needed to inform such a
strategy. Again, it is difficult to see how regulators can
use their resources best and intervene effectively if
such records are lacking or flawed. The United States’s
2002 semiconductor industry baseline occupational
health data project, developed for benchmarking pur-
poses, does not serve this purpose because occupa-
tional ill health and occupationally caused and related
diseases are not properly covered.
Market Regulation
Corporate social responsibility has been the mantra of
many organizations, governmental and commercial.
But whereas the rhetoric has proved strong, examples
of good practice by transnational companies in a global
setting are relatively few, and standards have all too
often fallen far short of the rhetoric.32,33
The U.S. semiconductor industry in the 1990s was
subject to voluntary environmental controls as a major
control strategy through two initiatives produced by the
EPA, one of which was called “the commons sense ini-
tiative.”19 Assessments of the effectiveness of such
schemes vary considerably. Industry and some govern-
ment agencies view them favorably; communities and
workers far less so. Commentators found neither initia-
tive to be a great success, and their failures do provide
some basis for critiquing the use of self-regulation in
the work-environment context. Effective legislation set-
ting good standards for protection of health and safety
may of course exist yet not be enforced by government
agencies. This is far more of a problem than the so-
called burdens of legislation.
“Technical” Regulation
Effective enforcement of regulations depends upon a
well-trained, well-informed, independent, well-resourced,
adequately staffed inspectorate supported by a judicial
system that values occupational health and safety at least
as highly as profitability and hence enforces the laws rig-
orously against offenders. Rarely, however, has regulatory
enforcement in the industry, be it in Belarus or Califor-
nia, China or Scotland, contained all or most of these
elements. Inspectors have usually been understaffed and
under-resourced, often and understandably therefore
lacked the time, detailed knowledge, and expertise to
inspect such a complex industry. 
Evidence from the United Kingdom in 2002 shows
that only significant external pressure from former
workers and NGOs led to the industry’s receiving any
systematic governmental inspection at all, and such
inspections have revealed major occupational health
shortcomings in many semiconductor plants.22 It also
became clear that the enforcement agencies had relied
on industry statements about chemical exposures and
occupational health records and had not carried out
any independent industrial hygiene testing in the
plants at all. Former workers from these plants describe
health and safety conditions and procedures in the
1980s and 1990s that are very different from those pre-
sented by the companies and accepted by the regula-
tory enforcement agencies. The United Kingdom may
be regarded in international terms as one of the better
countries for health and safety enforcement. There-
fore, the indicators from the 1980s and 1990s in the
United States and the 1990s and 2000s in the United
Kingdom are that effective enforcement of health and
safety laws in the semiconductor industry was at best
very limited and often entirely absent. These health
and safety enforcement problems extend globally to
developing countries.33
The limits of regulation and enforcement described
above are taken up in the next section, and some solu-
tions to the weaknesses and difficulties identified are
proposed.
WHO SHOULD REGULATE?
Role for Labor Inspectors; Roles for ILO and WHO
in Laying Down Good Practice
The role of labor inspectors in dealing with such pow-
erful and economically and politically influential indus-
tries as semiconductors depends on the existence of an
autonomous and adequately staffed and resourced
group of occupational health and safety professionals.
In the United Kingdom, many viewed the old govern-
ment factory inspectorate as such a group of effective
“labor” inspectors, although in recent years, the capac-
ity of such inspectors to operate in a deregulatory
framework must be questioned.34,35 Danish labor inspec-
tors have led a drive to improve inspection standards, to
protect the independence of such inspectors, and to
build in principles in their work that place the health
and safety employees at the top of their agenda. Unfor-
tunately, anecdotal or legal evidence exists of the subtle
and not-so-subtle pressures that may apply to inspectors
who carry out or propose rigorous enforcement stan-
dards. This has been manifest in Western Europe by
anecdotal evidence of the transfers of active inspectors
out of geographic sectors or areas of work, by damage to
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careers of those who are “overactive” or who speak out,
by the deaths of labor inspectors in Brazil, by the hospi-
talization of French construction inspectors, by the
great external pressures placed on inspectors and gov-
ernment researchers in India and Brazil who have been
active in addressing asbestos hazards.
Trade Union and Worker Safety Representatives
and Regulators
Trade unions may play an important part in monitor-
ing occupational health and safety in workplaces, press-
ing for higher health and safety standards and helping
to ensure effective management of hazards and risks.
Workers in trade unions have also filled gaps left by
poor regulation. Some workers have documented the
existence of “old” occupational disease epidemics
caused by conditions that should have been corrected
decades ago. They have on occasions shown how very
deficient national regulatory enforcement has been by
inspecting workplaces themselves and by recording and
documenting occupational disease cases in small towns
that sometimes exceeded those recorded in national
government statistics.11 By 1984, analysts of the Califor-
nia electronics industry already saw trade unions as a
critical influence on the struggle to improve occupa-
tional health in the industry.26 This must surely have
been partially due to failures of industry self-regulation
and state and federal inspections. Occasionally employ-
ers have taken a different tack and, where trade unions
do exist, aim to incorporate union members into the
management system so they contribute to both in plant
regulation and individual employee self-regulation. 
Some trade union organizations in the semiconduc-
tor industry in1980s, however, did not identify any role
for the effective enforcement of regulations and stan-
dards by labor inspectors.36 Efforts to ensure employees
could have input into inspection and enforcement activ-
ities in semiconductor plants can be traced back to the
early 1980s,26 but have usually been rebuffed by indus-
try and government agencies in many countries. Where
industry/government investigations of the semiconduc-
tor industry did occur, these usually shut out worker
representatives in the Northern hemisphere and often
lacked transparency, making meaningful assessments of
their rigor, depth, and validity difficult if not impossible.
Also, in many countries, there will be little trade
union activity because of legal, governmental, and
employer hostility to worker organizations. Belarus,
which has a semiconductor industry, has used the state
to try to outlaw and repress trade unions.20 Semicon-
ductor industries may specifically locate themselves in
such countries because, linked to anti-unionism, they
will often have low-wage, non-regulated economies with
low or no effective occupational health and safety regu-
latory systems, and grants and tax incentives to attract
industries. Transnational industries will look for skilled
workforces, unorganized workforces, and workforces
cowed by economic recession. In Western and to some
extent Eastern Europe, semiconductor plants have
located in exactly such places. Paradoxically, working
conditions may be poor because of a surplus of skilled
labor and a lack of alternative employment or, as hap-
pened in Scotland’s Silicon Glen, wages and conditions
in such plants may initially be “above average” and addi-
tional payments may be made to workers specifically not
to join a trade union.37 Long run changes in economies
occur, however, and wages and conditions may then
deteriorate in such plants, where occupational health
and safety problems will be neglected and where work-
force views on trade union benefits may alter. Many
such plants will then de facto be unregulated.
Community Regulators and Public Local Authorities
These do not usually have a direct impact upon work-
ing conditions, but they do inform the public, alert
workplace regulators, and provide examples of how to
reduce or remove industrial pollution problems cre-
ated by the semiconductor industries.10,12,38,39 Initiatives
in Japan and California from resident groups and
NGOs such as the Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition, and
others affected by semiconductor industry water pollu-
tion, have contributed to increased pressure for effec-
tive OHSE enforcement of the industry.12,39 In less pop-
ulated regions of the world, where plants either do not
present similar water-supply contamination threats,
where active NGOs and an alert media are not present,
or where middle-class residents have not been affected,
pressures for worker health and safety enforcement
alone rather than wider environmental enforcement
against the industry have been much less.20
OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE REGULATION
AND ITS ENFORCEMENT?
These are many and varied. A number have been iden-
tified in previous sections. Such obstacles may link to
political, cultural, economic, organizational attitude,
structures and approaches in complex and opaque
legal systems that all too often favor employers over
employees and plants over communities. Possible driv-
ers for complicity in ineffective enforcement linked to
inadequate regulation include:
• Nature of organizations—technical and political
controls over civil servants and local government
officers
• Lack of transparency and limited or no freedom
of information rights 
• Lack of resources to support staff workloads/needs,
fund investigations and possible prosecutions
• Lack of staff—enforcement, technical, scientific,
and legal staff—to pursue prosecutions
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• Patronage—overt and covert of those who do the
bidding of those who control or employ them.
• Political and commercial interference—difficult
to assess but indicated by recent research
• Lack of accountability—technocratic decision
making divorced from public accountability?
• Legal constraints in drafting of laws and legal con-
straints in operations of courts.
In the United Kingdom there have been shifts since
1997 in governmental attitudes to regulation that
incorporates some of the deregulatory thinking of the
previous governments while “accepting that regulation
is not only necessary but desirable in certain circum-
stances.”40 The DETR consultation document of 1999
on “Revitalising Health and Safety” identified action by
health and safety regulators as the last substantive item
on a list for action: preceded by actions from employ-
ers, designers, and workers.41 This may reflect the con-
tinued dominance of “Robens thinking,” which epito-
mized a self-regulatory philosophy espoused by Lord
Robens, who moved from head of the National Coal
Board to Vickers, a major engineering company. The
DETR document identified the regulatory tools avail-
able, listed in order as awareness-raising campaigns,
advice, and response to complaints, investigation,
enforcemental action, and prosecution. The document
specifically noted:
Some people argue that more regulatory effort
should be directed at punishment through investi-
gation, enforcement action and prosecution, partic-
ularly where lives have been put at risk. These activ-
ities use a lot of resources and more effort put
towards them would be at the expense of preventa-
tive activity. The HSE are conducting several proj-
ects to assess the best possible balance between reg-
ulatory measures.41
This begs questions in the United Kingdom about
the inertia generally of the Health and Safety Executive
(HSE) and the HSC at a senior level in terms of inves-
tigating what regulatory measures work and what do
not, what informs the ethical and moral decision-
making processes at work in the HSE, and how an
organization can conclude that enforcement would be
at the cost of prevention. This is so when there has
been little if any recent research available from the
HSE on the part played by large fines, prosecutions,
and imprisonment in deterring dangerous employers
and perhaps then preventing some accidents and ill
health in the workplace. There is a strange determin-
ism at work here. It may perhaps reflect national polit-
ical agendas where the key requisite is to be “friendly”
to those businesses that year in and year out, decade by
decade, have very poor health-and-safety-at-work
records affecting both employees and members of the
general public. These businesses may also contribute to
the political funds of the major political parties in the
United States and the United Kingdom. The DETR
observation on penalties that fail to deter people from
flouting health and safety law—namely the need for
such penalties to be higher—in some respects sits
strangely with the view that prosecutions take resources
away from preventive action. 
Neither the United Kingdom nor the United States
is a good model for effective health and safety regula-
tion of semiconductor industry. The United States’s
1980s model of tight supervision to ensure compliance
with health and safety laws did not work properly, and
OSHA inspectors had many constraints placed on their
activity. While the United Kingdom, where “preference
for informal persuasion [was elevated] to the status of
a fundamental policy principle,”42 never really got to
grips with powerful companies.
Industry too looks at how it may reduce or remove
what it perceives as the worst impacts of regulation and
enforcement. New EU chemical controls—Registra-
tion, Evaluation and Authorization of Chemical Sub-
stances (REACH)—present major challenges for the
semiconductor industry. The European semiconductor
industry association (EECA/ESIA) has attempted to
highlight the industry’s health and safety control
record. ESIA calls for “legislation proportionate to this
minimal exposure risk” and states that the contained
industrial systems used in semiconductor manufacture
“are almost completely isolated from employees and
the environment, thus attaining a minimal to zero
exposure risk.”43 ESIAs earlier response to draft
REACH papers was to raise several concerns.20 These
included emphasizing that their industry was global
and so EU controls could affect production in one
region when the same process chemicals were used
across the world; the industry depended on rapid
product development linked to massive investments
and so any “slow and cumbersome” chemical vetting
procedures would affect profitability and make Europe
“highly unattractive to investors”; the industry used
large numbers of chemicals with often single source
suppliers in a long chain. Such chemicals often had no
safer substitute available and controls could threaten
European chemical production.44 These are crude
arguments to water down REACH policies but demon-
strate how critical in occupational health and safety
terms is the need for networks, similar to those of man-
ufacturers, to be forged to protect employee and com-
munity health. 
CONCLUSION
Enforcement of sound regulations to protect occupa-
tional health in the semiconductor industry is one nec-
essary and essential part of effective industry and com-
pany control. Labor inspectors themselves recognize
that “good laws are a precondition to effective labor
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prevention” and labor inspectors should play “an active
and pivotal role’ in inspections.”45
Poor occupational health and safety performances
and significant occupational disease incidences and
prevalences across the globe have demonstrated the
necessity for both sound regulation and energetic
enforcement. U.K. evidence has raised seriously ques-
tions about the value of self-regulation in addressing
occupational health and safety problems.46 Where
there has been a complete or major reliance on volun-
tary action to promote occupational health or self-reg-
ulation, there has been failure.11 In this sense, bad
employers themselves have been responsible for the
introduction of statutory regulations and encourage
enforcement agencies to visit them when they reveal
poor industrial hygiene practices, health surveillance,
and engineering controls. The semiconductor industry
in many countries appears poorly regulated, and those
regulations seem to have been poorly enforced if they
have been enforced at all.
Proper enforcement of good regulations should of
course not mean unnecessary intrusion and unneces-
sary work for employers. Labor inspectors are also not
the only means available to ensure effective enforce-
ment of occupational health standards in the semicon-
ductor industry. Building stronger worker occupational
health organization linked to training, information,
and protected employment rights may help to ensure
good monitoring of standards in workplaces, better
recording of industrial hygiene practices, better
recording of ill health, and hence better and perhaps
more active enforcement action by the regulators.
Countries may have widely different economic, reg-
ulatory, technical, political, and cultural profiles. Yet
the health and safety challenges often remain remark-
ably similar. The recent blocking by industry of the
publication of a U.S. study about mortality in the semi-
conductor industry prevented critical health and safety
information from reaching workers in that industry
across the world.47 The global moves towards occupa-
tional health and safety deregulation and so called
“business-friendly” or, more correctly, “employee-hos-
tile” regulation compound the lack of freedom of infor-
mation to employees about the hazards and risks they
still face.48 Best practice in enforcing good regulatory
standards in this industry, to address such problems ,
therefore usually necessitates:
1. The development of a charter for labor inspec-
tors that offers meaningful protection and support for
them in their work, as well as adequate staff and
resources, and promotes best practice and autonomy
from industry and state influences
2. National governments’ commitment to introduc-
ing enforcing good health and safety laws—prescriptive
where necessary and risk-based where appropriate—
that are properly enforced and linked to meaningful
criminal and civil sanctions for those companies that
break the laws
3. Government and industry recognition of the
rights of workers to organize generally and specifically
with respect to occupational health and safety matters
linked to rights to receive information, negotiate with
companies, inspect workplaces, and stop work when
hazardous conditions are identified
4. An organized, well equipped—in terms of infor-
mation education, rights—workforce that has clear
trade union rights to address workplace health and
safety; these will provide another line in enforcing reg-
ulation—perhaps through the Swedish worker rights
system—not only to inspect workplaces but to stop
work in potentially dangerous situations
5. An alert, active, and independent media not
cowed or corralled by government and industry
6. Community and environmental groups willing to
work with trade unions and employees to press for
effective enforcement of work environment as well as
wider environmental laws
7. Better educated and informed boards and man-
agers who take the rhetoric of corporate governance
and OHSM systems and apply them to raising standards
and practices further in their own semiconductor plants
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